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A central policy of the Government of Indonesia’s strategy 
for enhancing its country’s economic and social devel-
opment is to develop infrastructure and expand service 
delivery. Public procurement reform is a key component 
of this policy. Despite the decentralization of financial 
responsibility and authority to relatively autonomous 
local level governments, procurement reform in Indone-
sia is a centrally-driven effort. In this paper, we examine 
the extent to which procurement reform is translating 
into improvements in sub-national performance. Data on 
local government procurement expenditures point to an 
overall decline in the volume of procurement, especially 
in poorer districts. This paper uses qualitative case stud-
ies of procurement reform in six local governments and 
finds that local government leadership is associated with 
the uptake of reform. There is little evidence to suggest that 
procurement reform has been “demand”-led, since neither 
the private sector nor Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
have been active in advocating for procurement reform. 
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1 Introduction
Policies designed to develop infrastructure and expand service delivery are
key elements of the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) strategy for the coun-
try’s economic and social development. There is broad consensus among
national officials and analysts that the expansion and improvement of the
country’s transportation network is vital in order to expand internal trade
and essential in order to improve the competitiveness of Indonesian manufac-
turing. Increasing access to services such as education, health, and sanitation
have a similar degree of prominence given their importance to improving the
lives of people and communities and enabling individuals to reach their full
potential.
Indonesia is becoming one of the most decentralized countries in the world
in terms of spending, with subnational governments spending 37 percent of
total public funds (World Bank, 2007, xv). Local governments are heteroge-
neous in terms of their wealth, administrative capacity, the quality of polit-
ical leadership, and the preferences of constituents along with several other
factors that are likely to impact local government efforts to improve citizens
welfare. Despite the decentralization of financial responsibility and authority
to relatively autonomous local level governments, procurement reform in In-
donesia is a centrally-driven effort. The central government introduced new
regulations, organizations, processes, and capacities to increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of the procurement system. Given the vastly different condi-
tions found across sub-national units, it is not surprising that early evidence
suggests that the uptake and partial implementation of procurement reform
is not translating into uniform improvements in procurement performance
across local governments.
Sub-national decision-making is not necessarily furthering Indonesia’s
progress toward achieving national objectives. In fact, the decisions of a
large portion of local governments with respect to how much to procure and
what to procure appear to be at odds with the GoI’s developmental goals.
Over the last few years, district governments have reduced the absolute and
relative value of their procurement spending. Declining procurement signals
a move away from capital investments in infrastructure and the purchasing of
goods and services vital to expanding service delivery to spending on either
administrative expenses or social protection. Existing disparities in infras-
tructure quality and services across local governments appear to be widening,
as poorer districts are particularly likely to be reducing their procurement
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spending. Thus, the general trend of declining procurement expenditures is
exacerbating widening disparities in economic and social well-being across
the country.
A review of the broader literature on procurement reform shows that
very little attention has been paid to how procurement reforms are actually
implemented in any setting and that studies are particularly sparse in rela-
tion to the implementation of reforms outside of central agencies. Overall,
policymakers tend to pay very little attention to the implementation of pro-
curement reform in decentralized settings. The focus of donor agency and
government efforts to monitor the implementation of procurement reform has
been on compliance. An emphasis on enforcing compliance is particularly un-
helpful in contexts like Indonesia, where local officials operate with a great
deal of independence from central authorities. In the context of Indonesia,
while LKPP is making an effort to support sub-national governments on pro-
curement reform, the agency is not fully equipped to respond to the large
number of districts and the scope of the reform.
This study examines the implementation of procurement reform at the
local level in Indonesia. It explores the pattern of the implementation of re-
form across time and space, and empirically tests a set of initial hypotheses
regarding factors that are likely to influence the uptake and implementa-
tion of reform. Specifically, we test whether the quality of local government
leadership and private sector voice influences local government decisions to
adopt and implement procurement reform. Factors relating to the the efforts
of civil society to provide an oversight role over procurement and the func-
tioning and organization of the central government’s and local governments’
public financial management are also likely to contribute to the current pro-
curement dynamics.
This study is the most detailed analysis of local level procurement reform
in Indonesia that has been undertaken to date and one of the most detailed
analyses of local level procurement reform in any context. There are several
limitations to this study including the recent nature of procurement reform in
Indonesia, limited standardized and disaggregated data on local government
procurement expenditures and performance and the small number of case
studies that our research covers. Given these limitations, this paper should be
viewed as an initial attempt to create a robust understanding of the dynamics
of procurement reform in Indonesia. An additional contribution of this paper
is the development of an analytical approach to procurement reform designed
to provide policy makers with operational inputs.
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The research presented in this paper is based on twelve months of desk
and field work that was undertaken to provide the empirical basis for de-
signing options for improving procurement performance in the short- and
medium-term.1 Our case study narratives of public procurement reform in
six districts and two provinces present a more detailed and nuanced picture of
the dynamics underlying the adoption and sustainability of the reforms than
this overview paper. The focus of other forthcoming analytical work (see
Turkewitz et al 2013) is on the relationship between the uptake of procure-
ment reform and subsequent improvements in procurement performance.2
Section 2 examines the main features of the public procurement system
in Indonesia, including a discussion of its historical antecedents. Section 3
provides a justification for using Indonesia as a case study to examine sub-
national variation in administrative reforms. Section 4 describes the study’s
methodology and fieldwork. Based upon a scan of existing procurement data,
Section 5 profiles procurement performance at the local level. Section 6 dis-
cusses the features that we expect to be associated with the uptake and
implementation of procurement reform at the sub-national level in Indone-
sia and Sections 7 and 8 present the main findings of our case studies. We
conclude the paper in Section 9 by offering a set of short-term policy rec-
ommendations for the GoI and pressing empirical questions for policymakers
within Indonesia and research on procurement more broadly.
2 Background on Procurement Reform in In-
donesia
Following the demise of the New Order regime in 1998, comprehensive pro-
curement reforms were instituted as part of a broader effort to improve In-
1This paper draws on background work that was commissioned by the World Bank
to inform the overall project, “Strengthening Reform and Improving Public Procurement
Performance in the AFR and EAP Regions” (Buehler, 2012; The Asia Foundation, 2012).
The Asia Foundation case studies are a joint product of the World Bank and The Asia
Foundation.
2In this companion piece, we discuss the availability and limitations of of sub-national
procurement data including: the scale of procurement; the quality of the contracting pro-
cess; the quality and value of procurement outcomes; and the equity (including compliance)
of the procurement process.
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donesia’s PFM system and the provision of public services and works.3 In
2003, the GoI adopted Presidential Decree No. 80/2003, which was later
replaced by Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 54/2010 on Public Goods
and Services Procurement. The reforms cover goods, works, and services
that use public funds irrespective of the size or value. It also established reg-
ulations for government procurers at all levels of the bureaucracy. Central
components of the reform include: the establishment of a National Public
Procurement Agency (LKPP-Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/ Jasa
Pemerintah); the roll-out of e-procurement; mandatory certification for offi-
cials involved in procurement; and the establishment of Procurement Units
(ULP-Unit Layanan Pengadaan) that are responsible for conducting public
procurement procedures on behalf of the government’s technical departments
(SKPD- Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah) and national offices.
First, established at the end of 2007 under Presidential Decree No. 106/2007,
the LKPP is a fully independent body reporting directly to the president and
chaired by an appointee from the bureaucracy. The LKPP is tasked with
the development of policies related to the public procurement of goods and
services. It also aims to strengthen procurement practices within the govern-
ment and provides advice and recommendations as well as dispute resolution
(Gatra, December 26, 2007, 12). The LKPP does not undertake procurement
operations directly nor does it have any purchasing or contracting function.
It is solely in charge of formulating procurement policies and overseeing their
implementation.
Second, Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 requires all local bureaucrats
involved in procurement to be procurement-accredited. To implement this
requirement, the GoI set up a certification system. The rationale for requir-
ing accreditation for procurement professionals was to try and professionalize
procurement within the bureaucracy. As a legacy of the New Order, procure-
ment professionals were limited in numbers and mostly employed in selective
line ministries. There were no distinct career paths or salary incentives for
procurement professionals. Bureaucrats joined procurement committees on
an ad hoc basis and upon completion of the project, returned to their former
positions. Consequently, institutional memory with regard to procurement
procedures remained fragmented and inefficient. Permenpan No. 77 issued in
3We understand the term “public procurement” to include all phases of the process —
the determination of needs, creation of specifications, tender process, contracting, contract
management and oversight up to the point of receiving and accepting the good, work, or
service.
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2012 has tried to address this issue by creating a career path for bureaucrats.
Third, the decree requires government units at both the national and sub-
national level to adopt an electronic procurement system (LSPE — Layanan
Pengadaan Secara Elektronik) for the processing of transactions by 2012.
Transactions include: the publication of contract opportunities; distribu-
tion of bid documents; submission of bids; and the publishing of contract
award winners. Adoption of e-procurement is viewed as essential to improv-
ing procurement outcomes due to its potential for reducing processing times,
increasing transparency, and reducing opportunities for collusive behavior
among bidders and between the government and the private sector. Utilizing
a common e-procurement platform also creates the possibility of promoting
the standardization of procurement processes, regardless of the size, sub-
stance, or location of the specific transaction. The system also includes an
on-line complaints mechanism that allows users to submit information about
perceived malfeasance during tender procedures. If e-procurement is suc-
cessfully rolled-out, the LKPP estimates that the LPSE will lead to cost
reductions of IDR 315 trillion (US$ 34 billion), which is around 30 percent
of the state budget.
Fourth, ULPs were established in an effort to standardize the organiza-
tion of procurement across the public sector. Presidential Regulation 54/2010
mandated that ULPs be established at all level of government by 2014. ULPs
are formal technical departments responsible for creating procurement plans,
scheduling and running of tender competitions, preparing cost estimations,
handling contracting with the winning bidder, and receiving and responding
to complaints and bidder appeals. ULPs do not have a mandate to monitor
the implementation of works and services. Movement to create ULPs has
been relatively slow, especially at the district level, perhaps due to a regu-
latory conflict regarding the number of permissible technical departments in
local governments.4
Perpres 54/2010 also aimed to increase transparency and competition and
to criminalize collusive procurement practices. Under the new regulatory
framework, procuring entities are now required to announce their procure-
ment plans, tender invitations and other related information in designated
national newspapers and the national procurement website. Documents in-
4Government Regulation No 41/2007 established numerical limits on technical depart-
ments at the district level. Many district governments have reached their limit and have
elected not to form ULPs, relying on the greater authority of a Government Regulation
over a Presidential Regulation based on the Indonesian hierarchy of laws.
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cluding criteria for tendering committees and procurement project leaders
have been standardized. To try and increase competition, Presidential Decree
No. 80/2003 abolished an earlier stipulation that only contractors located in
the province in which the tender was issued were eligible to submit tender
applications. The Decree also explicitly criminalizes collusive procurement
practices. Article 22 of the Competition Law, for instance, prohibits bid rig-
ging and collusive tenders. Likewise, the adoption of Presidential Decree No.
85/2006 on the 6th amendment of Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 includes
various articles aimed at the prevention of bribery and other corrupt conduct
in public procurement.
On paper, Indonesia’s procurement regulations are largely consistent with
international standards and practices. In practice, there is large sub-national
variation in the uptake of procurement reform, as well as variation in pro-
curement performance (see Section 5). As we discuss in the next section,
Indonesia offers a justifiable context in which to better understand the fac-
tors that are associated with the uptake and implementation of procurement
reform.
3 The Advantages of the Indonesia Case
For several reasons, post-Suharto Indonesia provides a justifiable case in
which to develop an empirically robust method to identify features that are
associated with the uptake of procurement reform and improved procurement
outcomes at the sub-national level. First, Indonesia is undergoing procure-
ment reform and there is a particularly compelling need to examine how
the GoI might modify reform efforts to be able to achieve improvements in
procurement performance.
Second, extensive decentralization of financial authority to local govern-
ments in Indonesia presents enormous opportunities for increasing the effec-
tiveness of public spending since it creates the potential for improving gov-
ernment accountability to citizens. Between 2004 and 2011, higher levels of
fiscal grants have been transferred to Local Councils. At present, subnational
governments obtain most of their revenues from general block grants from
which they finance around 80 percent of all district expenditure. Earmarked
grants have increased in past years but are relatively small in comparison
with other transfers. Own-source revenue is low at the district level (World
Bank, August 2012) and is expected to stay small compared to general block
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grants (World Bank 2007: xxi).
Further, there has been an increase in the number of service delivery and
administrative functions that have been decentralized to local governments.
Local governments can now decide freely on how they want to spend the Gen-
eral Allocation Grants (DAU), which constitutes the bulk of local revenues.
Also the funds from revenue sharing are untied and expenditure of these, like
the DAU, is completely at the discretion of subnational governments (Lewis
2005: 291-317). There is a constitutional mandate that requires subnational
governments to spend a minimum of 20 percent of their budget on education.
Over time, the capacity and effectiveness of local councils in delivering
public services to their communities has improved. However, changes in local
governments’ responsibilities have occurred unevenly. At the local govern-
ment level, there are also significant and persistent problems in the level
of public spending and in the delivery of public infrastructure and services,
which makes the need for improving procurement performance more press-
ing. Indonesian local governments may be spending more but they often fail
to channel these resources in directions that would meet local citizens’ needs
(Skoufias et al., 2011).
Third, Indonesia’s decentralization process has yielded significant varia-
tion in local government performance across sub-national units. Thus, In-
donesia provides a good case to examine the antecedents of the uptake of
reform given the sub-national variation on several key dimensions of inter-
est including the strength of local governments’ public financial management
(PFM) systems5, the quality of local governments’ leadership and the com-
petitiveness of the private sector. Fourth, as we discuss in Section 5, there is
also a wide amount of variation in the uptake of procurement reform initia-
tives and in procurement volumes across sub-national units.
4 Methodological Approach
We first commissioned a scan of procurement reform at the district and
provincial levels in Indonesia to be able to examine variation in both the
uptake of procurement reform initiatives and in spending patterns, as well
as variation in the composition of procurement expenditures over time. As
5Initially, we wanted to look at the role PFM systems play in procurement reform but
were unable to do so due to a lack of qualitative and quantitative data on PFM in the
districts in which we conducted the field work.
7
Table 1 illustrates, these initiatives are grouped into the following four dimen-
sions: (1) process — the establishment of e-procurement; (2) organization
— the establishment of ULPs; (3) capacity – the certification of officials in
procurement; and (4) monitoring — CSO oversight and the establishment of
complaint handling mechanisms.
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Table 1: Local Government Reform Initiatives
Concept Reform Initiative
Process Eprocurement
Organization Procurement Service Units (ULPs)
Capacity Mandatory certification of officials
involved in tender committees
Monitoring CSO oversight & complaint
handling mechanisms
Our indicators of the four initiatives include the following:
1. Eprocurement
• Status of the implementation of e-procurement
• Number and value of packages procured through e-procurement
between 2010 and 2010
2. ULPs
• Status of the establishment of ULPs
3. Mandatory certification of officials involved in tender committees
• Description of initiatives to develop the capacity of GoI officials
• Number of procurement accredited staff
4. CSO oversight and complaint handling mechanisms
• Description of CSO or community monitoring activities
• Status of the establishment of complaint handling mechanisms
The scan also collected data on the following three budget items for 2007 to
2010: total expenditure; procurement expenditure, or the total allocated for
goods and services and capital expenditures; and the contribution of unspent
budget to total expenditure.
We then commissioned structured case studies that are paired around
three hypotheses relating to three factors that are associated with procure-
ment performance: the quality of PFM systems for planning, budgeting,
spending and oversight of public money; the quality of a local government’s
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leadership; and the strength of the private sector (see Section 6.1). The case
study narratives also brought to our attention two additional variables that
contributed to the uptake of reform: the role of CSO voice; and inter-district
competition and diffusion of knowledge. We discuss these alternatives expla-
nations in Section 8.
Fieldwork was carried out in four regencies — North Luwu, Sijunjung,
Madiun, and Lamongan — and two cities, Makassar and Balikpapan. To
select districts, we used data from a scan of procurement reform efforts at
the sub-national level to create a database of all districts that have initiated
procurement reform. From this sample, we selected pairs of cases that have
different values on a key explanatory variable but similar values on control
variables. From the subset of candidate districts, we selected cases that are
relatively accessible and where either B-Trust or The Asia Foundation has
contacts (see Table 2).
Table 2: Case Selection
Variables Low High
Leadership Quality North Luwu Sijunjung
Private Sector Competitiveness Madiun Lamongan
Public Financial Management Makassar Balikpapan
We selected two districts, North Luwu and Sijunjung, which differ on the
quality of the leadership of their mayor or regent but have similar values on
other explanatory and control variables (e.g. population size and whether the
district is urban or rural). We measured leadership quality using data from
the 2007 and the 2010/2011 Local Economic Governance Surveys (KPPOD
and The Asia Foundation), which covered 12 and 20 provinces, respectively.
These surveys probed business owners about their perceptions of the integrity
and capacity of the Mayor/Regent. The survey asked respondents about
whether they agreed that the: (1) mayor/regent takes strong action against
corruption cases, (2) mayor/regent is not corrupt; and (3) the mayor/regent
has strong leadership.
We selected two cases, Madiun and Lamongan, which have different levels
of private sector competitiveness but have similar values on other variables.
We used the 2009 Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) as an indicator
of private sector competitiveness. For districts with missing 2009 RGDP
values, we used 2008 data.
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Finally, we selected two districts, Makassar and Balikpapan, which differ
in the quality of their governments’ PFM systems but have similar values on
other variables. As a measure of PFM quality, we use the average procure-
ment budget (capital investment, goods and services) as a proportion of total
expenditure for 2007 to 2011.6 The budget data for 2007 and 2008 is actual
budget realization and the data for 2009 to 2011 is planned expenditure.7
Since the narratives of the case studies did not include sufficient detail on
the relationship between the quality of Makassar’s and Balikpapan’s PFM
systems and the uptake of reform, we chose to eliminate the discussion of this
relationship from this paper. In a forthcoming paper (Turkewitz et al. 2013),
we use quantitative, time series data on the quality of districts’ PFM sys-
tems and procurement to illustrate the relationship between PFM systems,
the uptake of reform and procurement performance.
In each of the six localities, teams from Bandung Trust (B-Trust) and
The Asia Foundation carried out fieldwork for a period of two weeks. The
research teams used a snowball sampling approach to identify key individuals
involved in procurement for the study. Using instruments, they conducted
in-depth interviews and focus groups with key respondents from the local
executive and legislative branches, government departments, the private sec-
tor, journalists, academics and civil society. The teams collected government
documents, data and information, as well as policy documents, newspaper
clippings, reports and books.
A short description of the local governments included in our case studies
is below:
• North Luwu is a remote district (population 450,000) of South Sulawesi
that was a sub-district of Luwu district until 1999. Relatively large
geographically, North Luwu has large forest reserves (55% of the district
is zoned as protected forest) and natural resource opportunities that
6Our measure of PFM quality average expenditure on capital investment and goods
and services is an approximate but best available measure.
7We considered using the proportion of “unspent budget” (SILPA) and the value of
the administrative budget (personnel, interest, subsidy and contingency) as proxies, but
decided not to use these as indicators for two reasons. Our first batch case studies found
that a higher SILPA may indicate a higher level of competition in procurement rather
than the district’s inability to manage its budget. The administrative budget was not
used since it is already reflected by look at the average proportion of procurement in the
district budget (i.e., a higher administrative budget corresponds to a lower procurement
budget).
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include timber, rattan, palm oil, chocolate and oranges. The district
has a large migrant population from Java and Makassar, along with
indigenous communities. The forest sector is the largest contributor to
district revenues.
• Sijunjung is a small rural district in West Sumatra. Established in
1949, it was first named Sawahlunto/ Sijunjung until Kota Sawahlunto
became administratively separate in 1965. In 2008, the district fur-
ther split into Sijunjung and Dharmasraya, leaving the former with a
population of around only 200,000. With a geographic area of 3,180
km2, Sijunjung is sparsely populated by Indonesian standards. Its per
capita economy is around the Indonesian average: in 2008, the district’s
RGDP of IDR 2.4 trillion (USD 269 million) averaged out at IDR 12.1
million/person. Its poverty rate of 18.1% is quite high for Sumatra.
• Madiun is in East Java, located alongside the major transportation
lines between Surabaya and Yogyakarta. With a population of 770,440,
and a published poverty rate of about 6.5%, its economic base is mostly
agricultural (37%) followed by the trade and service sectors.
• Lamongan is quite a large district, with a population of 1.4 million. It
is located near East Java’s capital city of Surabaya and its economic
base is dominated by agriculture, fisheries and home industries. The
population has a comparatively high level of poverty, with 16.5% of the
people living in poverty. The construction sector has grown in the past
decade due to the expansion of privately-funded industrial and business
projects, and the development of public infrastructure including roads,
bridges, irrigation, the port, airport and tourism-related projects.
• Makassar is the provincial capital of South Sulawesi and is southern
Sulawesi’s primary port. As of 2010, its population size was 1.34 mil-
lion with an official poverty rate of 5.86%. Its economic base depends
primarily on the service sector, followed by the restaurant and hotel
business, transportation and communication, trading and finance.
• Balikpapan is a municipality located in the natural resource-rich province
of East Kalimantan. Its population of 621,862 mostly consists of second—
and third-generation migrants from South Sulawesi, North Sumatra
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and East Java who have established service sector businesses that sup-
port the large-scale oil and gas, palm oil, coal and other mining op-
erations in the districts neighboring the municipality. Balikpapan is a
relatively aﬄuent city with a low official poverty rate of only 2.5%.
5 Trends in Procurement Expenditure
Overall, since 2007, average annual procurement spending at the district
level has decreased, which has implications for local governments’ ability to
provide essential public goods and services. From 2007 to 2011, real procure-
ment expenditure (IDR Billion, 2011 price) at the district-level: declined in
65 percent of districts; increased in 13 percent of districts; and remained
relatively constant in 22 percent of districts (see Figure 1). Decreases in the
proportion of district spending that occurred via procurement were of a simi-
lar magnitude, moving from 50% of expenditures in 2007 to 41% in 2011. By
comparison, average annual procurement spending increased at the provin-
cial level over the same period. Specifically, real procurement expenditure
increased in 45 percent of provinces, declined in 15 percent of provinces,
and, remained constant in 39 percent of provinces (see Figure 2). As Fig-
ure 1 shows, districts in ‘Outer Island’ Indonesia spend more on procurement
than provinces and districts in Bali and Java. The same is true for provinces.
5.1 Process, Organization and Capacity: Variation in
the Uptake of E-Procurement, ULPs and Certifi-
cation of Officials
Following the passage of the 2003 Presidential Decree, national ministries and
sub-national governments developed e-procurement systems. For example,
the Ministry of Public Works and the Municipal Government of Surabaya
developed an e-procurement system, which it subsequently promoted in a
number of other districts. Since the 2010 Presidential Decree requires all sub-
national governments and ministries to adopt the LPSE system, ministries,
as well as local governments that initially adopted the Surabaya or another
system, are supposed to be transitioning to the LPSE system.
As of 2011, of Indonesia’s 497 districts, 21.92 percent instituted the
government-promoted LPSE and an additional 55.13 percent instituted a par-
tial e-procurement system, making e-procurement the most widely adopted
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Figure 1: As this figure illustrates, from 2007 to 2011, real procurement expen-
diture (IDR Billion, 2011 price) declined in the majority of Indonesia’s districts.
Specifically, real procurement declined in 65 percent of districts, increased in 13
percent of districts and, remained relatively constant in 22 percent of districts
procurement reform initiative. The adoption rate of LPSE, which is still
quite low, is significantly lower in Outer Island Indonesia (see Figure 3). A
small number of provincial and district governments have adopted and utilize
the LPSE system to accept bids and announce tenders. All five local govern-
ments (LGs) in DI Yogyakarta province use the LPSE for bid submissions,
in addition to announcing tenders.
In West Java, 81% of the 26 LGs have adopted the LPSE while the
remaining 19% are only using a partial e-procurement system for tender
announcements. The proportion of LGs that have adopted the LPSE is also
high in South Kalimantan (62%), Central Java (60%) and West Sumatra
(58%). By comparison, the use of e-procurement is still very low in several
provinces throughout Eastern Indonesia. None of the five local governments
in West Sulawesi has instituted e-procurement. Less than 15% of the LGs in
Papua, West Papua, Maluku and North Maluku use e-procurement.
On average, LGs with LPSE have higher procurement expenditures than
those with a partial e-procurement system or those without e-procurement
systems. Between 2007 and 2011, LGs using the LPSE also experienced a
higher growth in procurement expenditure as a portion of the total budget
compared to LGs, which have a partial or no e-procurement system. The ma-
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Figure 2: As this figure illustrates, from 2007 to 2011, real procurement expen-
diture (IDR Billion, 2011 price) increased or remained constant in all but five
provinces.
jority of LGs only use e-procurement to procure a small portion of their total
budget for goods, services and capital investment. On average, the value of
the packages procured through e-procurement is 11% of the budget allocated
for procurement expenditure. Only 18 LGs are using e-procurement to pro-
cure more than 20% of their procurement budgets. Three LGs, Kota Banda
Aceh, Kota Tangerang, and Kota Sawahlunto, are using the LPSE system
for more than 50% of their annual budget for procurement expenditure. The
total value of packages tendered using e-procurement in 2011 was the highest
in Kota Surabaya (IDR 843 billion), Kota Tangerang (IDR 291 billion) and
Kota Pekanbaru (IDR 219 billion).
As of 2011, ULPs have only been adopted in 26% (130) of LGs. As
Figure 4 shows, districts with ULPs are concentrated in eight provinces:
West Java, South Sulawesi, East Java, Central Java, West Sumatra, South
Sumatra, Central Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi (7 LGs). Meanwhile,
none of the 63 LGs in Papua, Riau, Jambi, and Maluku have established a
ULP.
There is less variation across districts in terms of local capacity build-
15
Use of E−Procurement as of 2010/2011
No E−procurement Partial E−Procurement E−Procurement
Figure 3: As of 2011, of Indonesia’s 497 districts, 21.92 percent instituted the
government-promoted LPSE and an additional 55.13 percent instituted a partial e-
procurement system, making e-procurement the most widely adopted procurement
reform initiative.
ing for public officials including certification and training in how to oper-
ate and maintain e-procurement. From 2007 to 2011, the overall number of
procurement-certified staff has increased at the district level across Indonesia.
Almost two thirds of districts have more than 100 procurement-accredited
staffs (see Figure 5). There is a strong association between the number of
staff certified in procurement in a district and average procurement expen-
diture (real terms) between 2007 and 2011; the bivariate correlation, or R2,
is 0.48.
There is a strong correlation between the uptake of one component of
procurement reform and the uptake of another. Local governments that
have adopted the LPSE are both more likely to have implemented ULPs and
more likely to have a higher number of staff certified in procurement. Of the
LGs with the LPSE or partial e-procurement, 45% and 23%, respectively,
also have a ULP. By comparison, of the LGs without e-procurement, only
18% have a ULP. The number of procurement-accredited staff is higher in
LGs with the LPSE (µ = 222.29) than in LGs with partial (µ = 83.95) or
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Figure 4: ULPs have only been adopted in 26% of LGs, or 130 LGs. As Fig-
ure 4 shows, districts with ULPs are concentrated in eight provinces: West Java,
South Sulawesi, East Java, Central Java, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Central
Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi.
no e-procurement (µ = 142.99). LGs with ULPs are only likely to have a
larger number of staff certified in procurement (µ = 174.88) compared to
LGs without ULPs (µ = 83.95).
The scan points to a strong positive association between the wealth of
a district and the uptake of e-procurement, as well as the certification of
staff involved in procurement. The average RGDP (2008, nominal terms) for
districts with LPSE and without e-procurement is IDR 13,120,497 and IDR
2,490,203. The correlation, or R2, between RGDP (2008, nominal terms)
and the number of staff certified in procurement as of 2011 is 0.36. Although
positive, the correlation between a district’s RGDP and the establishment of
a ULP is very small (0.02).
As the maps show, there are also geographic clusters of reform localities.
As shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 very few LGs throughout Outer
Island Indonesia including Papua, West Papua, Maluku and North Maluku
have implemented procurement reform. By comparison, of the 43 districts
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Figure 5: From 2007 to 2011, the overall number of procurement-certified staff has
increased at the district level across Indonesia. Almost two thirds of districts have
more than 100 procurement-accredited staff.
that have set up both the LPSE and ULP, the majority falls in West Java
(25.6%), West Sumatra (19%) and Central Java (19%). Future research will
examine the correlates of the spatial clusters of reform including districts’
distance to the early innovators, especially Surabaya, the presence of natural
resources and construction booms and the competitiveness of local elections.
Next, we turn to a discussion of the likely drivers of the adoption of procure-
ment reform, specifically, leadership and private sector voice.
6 Theoretical Framework
6.1 Leadership and the Uptake of Reform
A central focus of recent literature on policy reform is on leadership and
how leadership contributes to positive macro-economic, political and orga-
nizational outcomes and public goods provision (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011;
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Grindle, 2007, 2004). For example, from an analysis of eight controlled case
comparison in Indonesia, which includes 1,000 business surveys and 120 in-
terviews, von Luebke (2009) finds that the quality of government leadership
plays a central role in driving the quality of policy outcomes.8 Specifically,
he finds that district heads with solid managerial skills and long-term career
aspirations are more likely initiate broad-based reform and supervise bu-
reaucratic performance. Similarly, we expect the quality of local government
heads to affect whether they adopt procurement reforms and try to improve
local governments’ procurement performance.
There are a number of different arguments as to how leaders can posi-
tively impact these outcomes. Research points to the role that leaders play
in overcoming collective action and coordination problems within organiza-
tions by reducing information asymmetries and building trust between agents
(Ahlquist and Levi, 2011; Calvert, 1992). Other research shows how lead-
ers can effect change in an organization through the institutionalization of
a system of rewards and punishment that shifts how individuals work to-
gether (Andreoni et al. 2003). Within an organization, when leaders treat
subordinates with respect, subordinates respond with loyalty and greater
productivity towards producing public goods (Cook, Hardin and Levi, 2005;
MIller, 1992).
The social choice tradition stipulates that leaders who know how to ma-
nipulate the institutional situation can shape outcomes to their own benefit
or can modify institutional design to suit their goals (Arrow, 1970). A leader
who can control the agenda can also shift the equilibrium from any status quo
to almost any desired outcome (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011). In other words, in
the presence of multiple equilibria, leaders can help to shift the group decision
to their preferred outcome (Ahlquist and Levi 2011). Consequently, leaders
often serve a narrow constituency at the expense of others. Yet, institutional
arrangements, specifically agenda control and the presence of multiple veto
players including opposition parties and oversight institutions, can constrain
leaders. The extent to which leaders are able to influence policies depends
on institutional context — whether the country is, for example, a democracy
or autocracy. Even within democracies, however, leaders do not necessarily
serve the interests of the country. A larger literature documents how lead-
8von Luebke (2009, 210) measures the quality of government leadership using n index
consisting of perception based indicators of the district heads’ integrity, political will,
communication skills, power to change and popularity levels.
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ers can be harmful for countries (Weber, 1968). For example, leaders who
adhere to ideology and ignore evidence-based policies and even constituents’
demands are particularly dangerous. When leaders ignore feedback and dis-
courage learning, they are also likely to be harmful (Levi, 2006).
Leadership often involves building coalitions within and across organiza-
tions to be able to help implement a specific policy. There is some but limited
research that shows that reforms are more likely to be successful if leaders
across different hierarchical levels of authority come together as a coalition
and assume their various responsibilities and tasks (Fligstein, 1997; Mazaheri
et al., 2013). Most of the academic research on coalitions is mathematical
and abstract, or it focuses on the politics of developed countries with well-
organized parties, lobbies, and interest groups. There is very little academic
literature on coalition building within the civil service and in developing
countries (Humphreys, 2008; Maravall, 2010; Riker, 1962). Coalitions face a
myriad of obstacles that undermine their formation and durability including:
difficulties in bargaining enforcement, free rider problems and the existence
of multiple potential sets of possible coalitional partners (Levi, 2011). The
election of a new politician or the appointment of a civil servant may result in
renegotiation among the coalition partners, which can potentially undermine
the coalition.
To summarize, we expect that the take-up of procurement reform will be
closely associated with support from the executive and that support from
the executive is associated with quality of leadership.
6.2 Private Sector Voice
Demand side pressures for local governance procurement reforms can po-
tentially emanate from business firms and associations. For several reasons,
businesses should have a stake in seeing procurement performance improve.
In order to grow, firms need adequate infrastructure, such as roads, electric-
ity networks, ports, and education systems that can produce skilled employ-
ees. Businesses should have an incentive to pressure governments to improve
the quality of procured goods, especially roads. Further, in contexts where
bidding is susceptible to collusive practices, business that are not part of
powerful cartels are likely to have an incentive to push local governments to
improve the competitiveness and transparency of the tendering process.
Yet, like CSOs, businesses face a collective action problem that can im-
pede their ability to demand better procurement performance from govern-
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ment. In Indonesia, there are different types of firms including small firms
consisting of shop-keepers and craftsmen of various ethnic origins and repre-
senting a large part of civil society. There is also a small group of large indige-
nous firms that generate revenue from construction, procurement, resource
extraction and manufacturing (Luebke, McCulloch and Patunru, 2009). Both
groups are unlikely to play a role in demanding governance reforms. Because
of its large and dispersed structure, the first type of firm faces the classic
collective action problem. Business associations help the businesses to solve
this collective action problem. The incentives for the latter group, large in-
digenous firms, to criticize government and demand administrative reforms
are very low given that these firms would not want to risk losing access to
lucrative government contracts from which they currently benefit (Luebke,
McCulloch and Patunru, 2009).
Business associations help to solve collective action problems within the
private sector. A large literature highlights the role business association’s
play in facilitating rent seeking through lobbying and cartelization (Olson,
1982). Scholars also emphasize that business associations often impede the
development of the introduction of new technologies (Pyle, 2006, 493). Other
literature emphasizes that in weak states, business associations often press
for clean and effective government administration and provide its members
with services that promote economic growth and create social benefits (Doner
and Schneider, 2000). As the literature on the developmental state in East
Asia argues, when business associations regularly organize consultations with
government and mediate between its members and government, they can en-
hance economic development (Campos and Gonzalez, 1999). Further, busi-
ness associations frequently disseminate information about new technologies
and the reliability of potential trade partners (World Development Report,
2002).
In localities that are economically competitive and where business asso-
ciations represent a variety of types of firms, we expect business associations
to play a role in demanding greater procurement performance.
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7 Main Findings from the Case Studies on
Drivers of the Uptake and Implementation
of Reform
7.1 Leadership (Sijunjung vs. North Luwu)
In Sijunjung, local government leadership, which consisted of a unique com-
bination of three types of positions and skill sets, played a crucial role in local
governments’ adoption and implementation of procurement reform. The first
type, mid-level civil servants, created networks within the local government
bureaucracy and between local governments to garner support and momen-
tum for the reform. The second position, a civil servant, had the credible
technical expertise to be able to implement the reform. The third type, a
senior civil servant, had ties to the Executive and helped to secure the Exec-
utive’s consent to proceed with the reform. By comparison in North Luwu,
the district’s Executive (Bupati) drove the reforms and the coalitions of civil
servants that implemented the reforms were substantially narrower than in
Sjinjung. Ultimately, these two leadership styles had implications for the
longer-term sustainability of the reforms.
In Sijunjung, a small rural district, the Executive initiated procurement
reform and a team consisting of a senior civil servant, mid-career civil ser-
vants and IT specialists were responsible for implementing the reform. Our
respondents traced procurement reform to early 2007, when the combination
of an audit finding, alleged collusion and corruption in the tender process,
the poor quality of completed procurement projects and a high proportion
of unfinished contracts motivated the Bupati to initiate procurement reform.
At the same time, there was too few procurement certified staff (as of 2006,
there were only 30 staff) to handle the volume of procurement.
In response to these factors, the Bupati established a ULP in 2007 and
asked the ULP Secretariat to develop e-procurement. A team led by the Head
of the ULP Secretariat, two mid-career Development Administration staff
and a public official from the Inforkom Office with an IT background travelled
to Surabaya to learn more about e-procurement. These local officials were
critical to implementing the Executive’s directives. The two Development
Administrative staff and the official from the Inforkom Office were also tech-
savvy.9
9It is also worth noting that of the 20 procurement-accredited staff from Sjinugng’s
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Following this trip, although Surabaya offered to assist Sijunjung with
the development of their e-procurement system, the ULP decided to develop
its own e-procurement software. By 2008, the ULP and the Inforkom team
had developed and piloted a new e-procurement system, which was even-
tually replaced by the LPSE system in 2009. In addition to the ULP and
e-procurement, Sijunjung undertook other procurement reform initiatives.
To increase the number and capacity of procurement-accredited staff, the
ULP encouraged SKPDs to use their own budget to train and certify addi-
tional staff. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of procurement-accredited
staff increased from 15 to 165. Sijunjung stands out in that it updates and
publishes a list of standard unit costs for construction on a quarterly basis.
The Executive issues the updated rates through a decree. Subsequent to the
2010 elections, continued executive and civil service support for reform has
contributed to the sustainability of reform established in Sijunjung.
We observed a similar pattern of reform in Lamongan, where three pro-
active civil servants initiated procurement reform. Of the three civil servants,
the first was a prominent young official, who was the Section Head for a
Development Unit that was responsible for monitoring and assisting all local
government technical units (SKPDs) in procurement practices. The Bupati
instructed this civil servant to “make Lamongan well-known for reform.” The
second member of the coalition was the head of a sub-directorate under the
first civil servant’s supervision. The third was a former public works official
nearing retirement, who was also close to the Bupati10 and was motivated to
“make his mark” by implementing reform.
Several factors drove this team of three to initiate the reform. First,
there was a limited number of procurement-accredited staff in the LG. As
of 2008, there was fewer than 50 accredited staff. Second, there were grow-
ing concerns that corruption among vendors and political interference was
undermining the competitiveness and transparency of procurement. Third,
the team was inspired by the success of neighboring Surabaya, whose ULP
and e-procurement appeared to be an attractive solution to the procurement
problems in the district. They believed that the ULP would reduce the num-
ber of requisite procurement-accredited staff, and that e-procurement would
reduce physical interaction with bidders thus reducing corruption.
Public Works Department, a quarter are women and all are trained engineers. Interviews
revealed their enthusiasm for procurement and their deep understanding of procurement
issues.
10We use the terms Executive and Bupati interchangeably.
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To implement the reforms, the team identified allies in Public Works,
Agriculture, Planning and Social Affairs (all Echelon 3 (middle management)-
level officials and below), and together they were trained by the LKPP in
Jakarta. Subsequently, this larger group attempted to persuade their supe-
riors, the SKPD heads, and solicit support from various departments and
parliamentarians about the benefits of procurement reform. They faced lim-
ited resistance from government officials and the close relationship between
one of the civil servants and the powerful Bupati made other government
officials reluctant to try and block progress. The Bupati issued an executive
order to establish the ULP and LPSE in mid-2010.
Unlike other districts, the ULP in Sijunjung did not take over respon-
sibility for conducting procurement from the SKPDs. Instead, the ULP
plays facilitating roles including scheduling procurement, announcing the ten-
ders, copying and distributing tender documents, coordinating tender meet-
ings, and receiving the bids from tenderers. More importantly, the ULP
provides procurement-accredited staff to conduct procurement under each
SKPD. Since the ULP is not authorized to conduct procurement, the local
government of Sijunjung insists that this is not the same body as the one
requested under Perpres No. 54/2010 on Public Procurement, and there-
fore refers to it as a Procurement Service Secretariat (Sekretariat Layanan
Pengadaan or SLP) and not a ULP.
By contrast, in North Luwu, a small, remote, recently established dis-
trict, the Executive drove the reforms and the coalition of civil servants that
implemented the reforms was narrower than in Sijunjung or in Lamongan.
Subsequent to his election, North Luwu’s Executive Leader started investing
in IT and communications in a high-profile effort to “create North Luwu from
nothing” and differentiate it from other districts. The district developed fast
communication towers and Internet connections and in response to this heavy
investment in IT, e-procurement was discussed as early as 2008. In 2007-08,
a series of sensational stories about government corruption dominated local
newspaper headlines.
Against this backdrop, in 2008, the Executive Leader initiated procure-
ment reform by first meeting with all SKPD heads and expressing interest
in adopting Surabaya’s model of e-government as a way to combat corrup-
tion. The Bupati then ordered the head of the development administration
section to visit Surabaya together with him, members of the provincial leg-
islative council (DPRD) and the SKPD heads. During this visit, the Execu-
tive Leader signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Mayor
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(Walikota) of Surabaya to support e-procurement in North Luwu. Upon his
return to North Luwu, he issued a Bupati decree on e-procurement and estab-
lished a ULP. Beginning in 2009, the ULP processed and used e-procurement
for all procurement packages for all technical departments (SKPDs) with a
value per package of IDR 100 million (USD 11,111) or higher. From 2010, the
ULP administered all procurement packages, including direct appointments,
using the LPSE system.11
A year later, following the launch of the national policy on LPSE, North
Luwu migrated to the national LPSE system, and started using it to handle
bidding for any type of project with a value of at least IDR 100 million (USD
11,100). Similar to the Mayors of Balikpapan and Madiun, the Executive
tried to mitigate the local private sector’s resistance to e-procurement. The
Executive confronted this resistance through open dialogue with the business
associations promising training for e-procurement. The Bupati strategically
communicated to businesses that by restricting training to local business, the
district was conferring upon them an advantage. The local government also
provided local vendors with on-line hot spots to submit tenders. The Bu-
pati’s dialogue with local businesses and provision of training and hot spots
preempted or at least lessened private sectors’ resistance to e-procurement
and procurement reform, more broadly.
In December 2009, the Bupati resigned from his post and returned to a
position in the central government. Some in the successor government have
publicly questioned the value of the e-procurement system while others are
increasingly vocal about their objections to new practices. Limited high level
support, combined with antagonism from mid-level executing agency officials
and contractors, has stalled the progress of reform.
To summarize, our case studies did not find that the executive played a
critical role in either blocking or facilitating procurement reform. Rather, a
critical factor for the adoption and sustainability for procurement reforms in
Sijunjung was the presence of a leadership team consisting of a unique combi-
nation of skill sets and positions. The reform team consisted of members who
were tech-savvy, mid-career civil servants who were able to build coalitions
to help gain support for the reform within the bureaucracy and a senior-level
civil servant who had influence over the executive. The Executive’s support
for the reform in Sijunjung was a necessary but insufficient factor as we saw
from the case of North Luwu, where the Executive’s reforms were undone by
11Each SKPD is responsible for making direct appointments decisions.
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his successor.
This finding highlights the need for a better understanding of leader-
ship and coalition building within the civil service and how coalitions can
contribute to reforms. Most of the academic research on coalitions is math-
ematical and abstract, or it focuses on the politics of developed countries
with well-organized parties, lobbies, and interest groups (Levi, 2011). There
is very little academic literature on coalition building within the civil ser-
vice and in developing countries (Humphreys, 2008; Maravall, 2010; Riker,
1962). Coalitions face a myriad of obstacles that undermine their formation
and durability including: difficulties in bargaining enforcement, free rider
problems and the existence of multiple potential sets of possible coalitional
partners (Levi, 2011). The election of a new politician or the appointment
of a civil servant may result in renegotiation among the coalition partners,
which can potentially undermine the coalition. The case studies of Sijun-
jung and Lamongan raise several questions including how the coalition in
the former district was able to overcome a number of obstacles while the
efforts of the coalition in Lamongan proved to be unsustainable. How were
the commitments of the coalition members to advocate for and implement
procurement reform made? How did the coalition members enforce these
commitments? What conditions helped to keep the coalitions together over
a long enough time for the reform to be implemented? In pursuit of procure-
ment reform, what kinds of bargains did the coalition members make with
one another and with politicians and members of the private sector?
7.2 Private Sector Competitiveness (Lamongan vs. Ma-
diun)
In localities that are economically competitive and where business associa-
tions represent a variety of types of firms, we expected to observe business
associations pressing for procurement reform. We also expected business
associations to provide welfare-enhancing services to its members including
information about new technology. By comparison, in localities where the
market is thin and dominated by a small number of large indigenous firms,
business associations are unlikely to try and block reform. Our findings pro-
vide support for the latter but not for the former hypothesis.
Lamongan is a large district, with a population of 1.4 million and agri-
culture, fisheries and home industries dominate its economic base. In the
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past decade, the construction sector has grown due to the expansion of
privately-funded industrial and business projects, and the development of
public infrastructure including roads, bridges, irrigation, the port, airport
and tourism-related projects. As we learned from the case study, the presence
of “premanistic”12 businesses with strong links to corrupt practices in collu-
sion with elected representatives of various parties and government officials
have undermined the competitiveness of the private sector and preempted
demands for procurement reform.
In fact, with the backing of the Bupati, the presence of a coalition of
three civil servants who advocated for and implemented reform was ulti-
mately not strong enough to overcome the private sector and politicians’
resistance to reform. The coalition initiated procurement reform during the
Mayor’s second term for three reasons. First, there was a limited number of
procurement-accredited staff in the LG. As of 2008, there was fewer than 50
accredited staff. Second, there were growing concerns that corruption among
vendors and political interference was undermining the competitiveness and
transparency of procurement. Third, the team was inspired by the success of
neighboring Surabaya, whose ULP and e-procurement appeared to be an at-
tractive solution to the procurement problems in the district. They believed
that the ULP would reduce the number of requisite procurement-accredited
staff, and that e-procurement would reduce physical interaction with bidders
thus reducing corruption.
During his second term in 2010, the Bupati issued an executive order to
establish a ULP and LPSE. Under the Bupati’s successor, the three team
members that drove procurement reform have been transferred to different
positions that do not involve procurement-related tasks. The civil servant
who was assigned to head the ULP denied that the ULP even exists in La-
mongan. He also claimed that the district is no longer using e-procurement
because the Presidential Instruction does not require the LPSE to be oper-
ational until 2014. There are also allegations of political interference and
corruption in the procurement process. Parliamentarians from PKB, PDIP,
PAN and Golkar openly admit to having connections with contractors (or
are contractors themselves), and to using their government position to en-
sure certain vendors win government business (The Asia Foundation, 2011,
6)
Rather than resisting procurement reform, the private sector in Madiun
12Preman is a term for a gangster who uses violence and intimidation for extortion.
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is using procurement reform to advance their particularistic interests. Ma-
diun’s government initiated procurement reform in 2011 to comply with the
national directive requiring e-procurement to be but in place by 2012. Ma-
diun’s Development Administration unit selected procurement-accredited of-
ficials from across different government units to be trained by the LKPP,
and installed the LKPP’s e-procurement software in the IT system of the
Local Development Planning Board (Bappeda). The government then dis-
seminated information about e-procurement to all government implementing
units, as well as to eight professional units whose members are vendors that
bid on public projects.
Local contractors used the launch of the LPSE as an opportunity to
raise their concerns about what they view as unfair competition from large
contractors from outside the district, who already have experience with using
e-procurement in their home districts. The main concern of local contractors
is the growing number of awards to competitors from Surabaya and other
parts of Central and East Java, particularly for large-value projects (> IDR
1 billion/USD 110,000).
Currently, business owners are lobbying the local government for mea-
sures that would give preference to local vendors. For example, some private
sector actors suggested adding selection criteria that would give more weight
to local vendors, particularly on bids valued at below IDR 1 billion (USD
110,000). If vendors are local, they argue, the government will be able to
monitor contractor performance more easily. The local government appears
sympathetic to these arguments, and is considering introducing protectionist
measures.
In none of the other cases did we find that the private sector played a
positive role in advocating for procurement reform. Of our six cases, Ba-
likpapan has the most vibrant economy and the lowest official poverty rate
(2.5%).13 The presence of lucrative private sector opportunities makes par-
ticipation in public sector activities a less attractive option for local firms.
Given the vibrancy of the construction industry in Balikpapan, the opportu-
nity costs for large, local firms to participate in public procurement are high.
A local Chamber of Commerce (Kadin) official pointed out that over 1,500
construction-related contractors are registered in the municipality, while only
300 public works projects are tendered annually. Because the private sector
13The major industry is the service sector, which supports the large-scale oil, gas, palm
oil, coal, and other mining operations in the districts neighboring the municipality.
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has few stakes in the outcome of procurement reform, they neither resisted
nor advocated for reform. Informants, NGOs, the business community, the
media and the government agreed that with the advent of e-procurement,
there has been little resistance to procurement reform and collusion and cor-
ruption in public procurement has disappeared.
8 Other Findings from the Case Studies
8.1 CSO Voice
There is very little evidence from the case study narratives to suggest that
procurement reform has been “demand” led since CSO’s have not been very
active in advocating for procurement reform. Yet, CSO’s as in Balikpapan
and Madiun, are beginning to experiment with different ways to engage on
procurement primarily through monitoring contract performance. These ef-
forts have demonstrated the proof of concept — that CSOs can undertake
monitoring, uncover problems, and find ways to bring those problems to the
notice of government officials in ways that have effect. These is currently lit-
tle sense of how CSO can scale up their procurement monitoring efforts and
collaborate with others actors (public and private) in ways that will enhance
procurement outcomes.
A large literature emphasizes that local elections and decentralization
empower civil societies to demand better government performance (Adsera,
Boix and Payne, 2003). In some contexts, CSOs play an important role in
advocating for and influencing government reforms. In the Philippines, for
example, Procurement Watch Inc. (PWI) played a central role in advocating
for the passage of Philippines’ procurement reform (Campos and Syquia,
2005). The ability of CSOs to influence policymaking depends on a variety
of factors including the informational and monetary resources a movement
can obtain and employ (Kitschelt, 1986). In contexts, where CSOs have both
the requisite resources and access to the political sphere, they are likely to
be able to influence procurement reform. In districts that have a vibrant
CSO sector, we expected to observe CSOs advocating for local governments
to adopt procurement reform as part of a broader effort to push for greater
fiscal transparency.
Only in Sijunjung did we observe a CSO indirectly contributing to the lo-
cal government’s uptake of procurement reform. Although CSOs in Sijunjung
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are quite limited14, we identified one active NGO in Sijunjung, the Institute
of Independent Monitoring and Community Empowerment (LP3I)15, which
indirectly helped to catalyze procurement reform efforts from the Bupati.
LP3I has five staff, as well as village-level volunteers, who monitor the im-
plementation of government projects, collect community complaints about
public services, and report their findings to the responsible SKPD. If it is
not satisfied with the SKPD’s response, LP3I helps communities to lodge
formal complaints. In 2008, while monitoring the tender of a local hospi-
tal, LP3I raised concerns that the tender process was unfair and a contract
was awarded on the basis of political connections. We were told that these
allegations prompted the Bupati to take steps towards procurement reform.
In addition to influencing the uptake of procurement reform, increasingly,
CSOs in Indonesia and elsewhere are experimenting with third party mon-
itoring of contracts as a means to improve procurement performance and
service delivery. In some contexts, CSOs monitor the tendering process but
more commonly, CSOs are involved in grassroots monitoring of procurement
contracts (Olken, 2007).16
In Madiun and Balikpapan, while CSOs did not play a role in the uptake
of procurement reform, they are actively monitoring procurement contracts
and thus, contributing to the implementation of procurement reform. We,
however, do not have any evidence as to whether these or monitoring ef-
14There are no independent local newspapers, and the local correspondents for the three
provincial level newspapers — Singgalang, Padang Express and Haluan — are government
officials who work for the Inforkom office. Of the three local radio stations, the local gov-
ernment owns two and a local vocational school owns the third. None of these media
outlets monitor local government performance. A case involving the persecution of collu-
sion among a contractor, the Head of the Irrigation Unit and the Head of the Procurement
Committee relied on evidence an NGO, Wahana Komunikasi Rakyat (WKR) compiled.
15LP3I, which was established in 2001, is part of the Regional Poverty Reduction Co-
ordination Team (TKPKD).
16We know little about how CSOs and communities are able to overcome several re-
lated challenges to monitor procurement performance. For instance, accessing detailed
information about contracts and developing the skills to be able to interpret and utilize
this information is challenging. The evidence on the effectiveness of community-based
monitoring of publicly procured service delivery is mixed. In his study, Olken (2007) ex-
amines the impact of audit and grassroots monitoring of roads in Indonesia found that the
expectation of external government audits was more effective than grassroots monitoring
at preventing corruption in road construction. Grassroots monitoring reduced the theft
of wages but not the theft of project materials. Devarajan, Khemani and Walton (March
2011) review other studies on grassroots monitoring).
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forts in other districts are contributing to better procurement performance.
In Madiun, the NGO, WKR, which was established in 2009 before the dis-
trict initiated procurement reform in 2011, is focused on monitoring public
projects, particularly infrastructure. With a staff that includes two engi-
neers, as well as personnel with backgrounds in law, journalism and IT, in
the past two years, WKR has monitored a number of public works projects.
WKR’s approach has been to use its ties to local media to pressure con-
tractors and/or the government to fix any problems it discovered before the
project is completed. Moving forward, WKR plans to only release its find-
ings following the completion of a project and then use evidence of poor
practices to prosecute or blacklist and punish poorly performing contractors
and officials.
During the rollout of e-procurement reform in Balikpapan in 2007, Trans-
parency International Indonesia (TII) supported the development of a local
umbrella CSO, “Community Forum for Transparency” (FORMAT). After
having received training from TI Indonesia and Indonesia Corruption Watch
(ICW), FORMAT has begun to monitor eleven high-value procurement con-
tracts. FORMAT selected these projects from a longer list of procurement
projects they obtained from the ULP.17 FORMAT mobilizes volunteers from
communities that are located near the project site to monitor the work and to
submit bi-weekly reports designed to flag concerns. These volunteers analyze
the contract, discuss the technical specifications with external contractors to
ensure they understand the technical specifications of the tender, and identify
indicators to best measure compliance with the contract. If the volunteers
discover problems, an investigation team is then sent in to collect evidence
of the infraction. Before releasing their final report to the public, they allow
the government to comment on their findings.
8.2 Inter-District Diffusion of Knowledge and Compe-
tition
The literature on new institutionalism suggests that the head of organizations
tend to adopt models from similar organizations if they believe that the orga-
17Of the 11 projects selected, the team has only obtained technical specifications for the
Public Works projects, despite making written requests to the Departments of Education
and Health and the Mayor. They hope to use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
but a Provincial Information Commission has yet to be established.
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nization is likely to enhance its organization’s legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan,
1977). Consequently, this form of normative isomorphism leads organiza-
tions to adopt surprisingly homogenous organizational forms (Dimaggio and
Powell, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In Indonesia, we observed that
early adopters of e-procurement modeled their e-procurement systems after
Surabaya’s as part of an effort to bolster their district’s prestige.
Officials from Makassar, North Luwu and Balikpapan each reported that
visits to Surabaya and subsequent low-cost technical assistance for e-procurement
from Surabaya was central to their successful initiation of procurement re-
form. Balikpapan’s interest in procurement reform first emerged when a
number of mid-level Balikpapan officials visited Surabaya in the 2007-08 pe-
riod and were impressed with the Surabaya’s nascent model of e-procurement.
For a one-time royalty fee of IDR 10,000,000 (USD 1,100), Surabaya provided
Balikpapan with software and technical support and trained Balikpapan of-
ficials in how to use the software. Officials in Sijunjung, Lamongan and
Madiun were also initially motivated by the example of Surabaya to imple-
ment e-procurement. However, for various reasons they did not utilize its
technical assistance. In many of the cases, an additional factor that con-
tributed to the adoption of procurement reform was a desire on the part of
the Executive to try and make his district well known throughout Indonesia.
In Sijunjung, the Executive strove for his district to be among one of the first
to implement e-procurement reform as he saw early adoption as a source of
pride. Lamongan’s Bupati’s vision of trying to make Lamongan famous was
consistent with the efforts of his civil servants to implement reform. More
importantly, LKPP’s offer to help develop Lamongan into a regional hub for
procurement training in East Java offered the Executive a chance to make
his district shine among other districts in East Java.
From the outset, North Luwu’s Executive was vocal about his ambitions
to make North Luwu a model for successful decentralized governance. In
2003, the Mayor received his first leadership award from the State Ministry
for State Administration and Bureaucracy Reform (Menpan), followed by
numerous other recognitions and awards in subsequent years. The Bupati
also started investing in IT and communications in a high-profile effort to
“create North Luwu from nothing” and differentiate it from other districts.
Communication towers and faster Internet connections were developed in the
district, and in response to this heavy investment in IT, the Bupati started
to explore e-procurement as early as 2008. Subsequent to a visit to Surabaya,
the Bupati issued a decree to establish a ULP and adopted e-procurement.
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In Makassar, the Mayor tried to bring visibility to his district by modi-
fying the central government’s procurement policies and procedures. For ex-
ample, while Makassar’s current e-procurement system comes straight from
the LKPP, in 2012 they plan to revise the standard operating procedures
(SOP). Makassar has not yet established a ULP claiming that the LKPP’s
“off the shelf” ULP structure is too complex and needs to be adapted in
order to work in the local context of Makassar.18
9 Conclusion
The research discussed in this paper is a first step to create a rigorous ana-
lytical approach to examining implementation of procurement reform. The
overall decline in the volume of procurement at the local level raises several
questions and challenges a national objective of improving infrastructure.
As discussed in Section 5, since 2007, there has been a decrease in average
annual procurement spending at the district level. From 2007 to 2011, real
procurement expenditure (IDR Billion, 2011 price) has declined in 65 per-
cent of districts. During the same time period, there was also a decrease in
the proportion of district spending that occurred via procurement from 50%
of expenditures in 2007 to 41% in 2011. The clusters of districts that have
experienced a decline in procurement expenditures over time point to grow-
ing disparities in procurement performance between rich and poor districts.
The decline of procurement expenditures in poorer districts is of particu-
lar concern as poorer districts have a greater need for public services and
commercial opportunities afforded by public procurement.
As this paper shows, there is a significant amount of variation in the
uptake and implementation of procurement reform in Indonesia. Data on the
uptake of procurement reform across Indonesia point to a strong association
between the wealth of a district and the adoption of procurement reform. The
geographic clusters of districts that have adopted procurement reform suggest
that procurement reform is lagging in poorer districts. Further, across local
governments we find a strong correlation between the uptake of one type of
reform and the uptake of another type of reform. For example, the number
18The Municipality of Makassar is also proud of its self-designed ombudsman program.
When a Presidential Instruction required all cities to implement a centrally designed om-
budsman system, Makassar appealed to the Constitutional Court and won the right to
retain its own system.
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of procurement-accredited staff is higher in districts that have adopted e-
procurement. ULPs are more likely to be established in districts that have
adopted full or semi e-procurement. To summarize, the strong association
between the wealth of a district, its level of procurement expenditure and
the uptake of reform raises a concern about whether different approaches to
procurement may exacerbate disparities in development opportunities across
Indonesia.
Further, as demonstrated by the high degree of the incompleteness of pro-
curement reform across space, our analysis shows that the implementation of
procurement reform should not be viewed in binary terms, or in “yes” or “no”
terms. As of 2011, whereas only about one-fifth of districts have adopted the
LPSE system, a little over half of districts use a semi e-procurement system.
The utilization of e-procurement is still limited as only 11 percent of the
total district’s procurement budget was e-procured. Across our case stud-
ies, there is also variation in the role and functions the ULPs are carrying
out.19 In Sjinjung, for example, the ULP is not actually conducting procure-
ment transactions; rather, it is merely facilitating procurement transactions
across the local government’s SKPDs. By comparison, the ULPs in Balikpa-
pan, North Luwu and Lamongan were established to conduct procurement
of goods, services and works on behalf of the local government’s SKPDs.
Our analysis suggests that the wealth of a district and local government
leadership are associated with the uptake of reform. There are three policy
implications that emerge from these findings. First, in order to find ways to
increase procurement volumes in districts that have experienced a steep de-
cline in expenditures over time, it is important to determine the factors that
influence decisions regarding how much money to dedicate to procurement.
Second, in the short term, there is a need to focus on approaches to improv-
ing procurement in poorer districts and those where effective leadership does
not exist. These districts may require the assistance of provinces to help with
procurement, as well as help with identifying alternative ways of developing
local-level infrastructure. LKPP could also play a more active role in ca-
pacity building by benchmarking practices and outcomes across sub-national
entities.
Third, our analysis of the implementation of procurement reform has po-
19In this paper, we are only examining the status of local governments implementation of
procurement reform. As such, we describe the variation in the functions ULPs are carrying
out. We are not comparing the effectiveness of the different administrative models.
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tential implications for multi-stakeholder strategies to improve procurement
performance. For example, our analysis of the six case studies indicates the
interests of a portion of the private sector to maintain existing procurement
practices. Some members of the private have concerns that procurement re-
form will lead to greater transparency and competitiveness that may under-
mine their ability to win tenders. While ultimately unsuccessful in blocking
the reforms, members of the private sector in Sjinjung, Madiun, Makassar
and North Luwu, used the vehicle of contractors’ associations to try and block
the uptake and implementation of procurement reform. This finding should
be taken into consideration multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the Con-
struction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST), that sometimes presuppose
active support from the private sector.
The decrease in procurement expenditures that has taken place across
the majority of Indonesia’s districts across time is worrying and raises several
questions about the causes of the decline.20 In future research, we plan to
examine the political economy dynamics behind the composition of local
government expenditures including procurement expenditures and address
several questions including the following. How much variation exists across
space and time in the composition of local government expenditures? What
are the trade-offs to a local government’s decision to allocate a greater or less
of a share of its budget for procurement versus administrative/civil service
or social safety net expenses? To what extent do electoral incentives and the
threat of central government oversight including audits explain variation in
the composition of local governments’ expenditure over time and space?
In addition to examining the factors that influence decision-making on the
level of procurement expenditures, in future work, we plan to examine other
factors that might be associated with the uptake of reform including the tim-
ing of the central government’s release of budgets to local governments, the
strength of auditing and the sectoral distribution of expenditures. There is
also an additional need to examine variables that are likely to affect procure-
20There are several potential explanations for the relatively low level of capital invest-
ments. For example, central block grants are calculated based on the size of the local
government apparatus. This formula creates incentives for local administrators to increase
the size of their bureaucracy and disincentives to spend their funds on the procurement of
goods, services and works. Central government expenditures on capital investments at the
local level tend to crowd out local government expenditures (World Bank, August 2012).
Neither of these explains the variation in the composition of local government expenditures
or the decline in expenditures on capital investments.
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ment performance including CSO monitoring and the size of contracts. The
focus of our on-going and planned follow-up work is on developing useful ways
to measure procurement performance. Developing measures of procurement
performance is essential to be able to understand the relationship between
the uptake of reform and improved outcomes — a topic discussed in a com-
panion piece by Turkewitz et al. 2013. In the companion piece, we identify
a set of performance-based indicators of procurement and examine the re-
lationship between the uptake and implementation of procurement reform
and subsequent performance. Specifically, across the six case studies, the
companion piece examines indicators of the level of competition, competence
and capacity, transparency of procurement-related information, efficiency,
and compliance.
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